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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1360 
_____________ 
 
JAMES H. JACKSON, 
 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
LOUISVILLE LADDER INC.;  
W. W. GRAINGER, INC.  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 11-cv-01527) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2014 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 16, 2014) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
James Jackson appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial by the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  We will affirm. 
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I. Background 
Jackson injured himself when he fell off a step ladder while investigating a ceiling 
leak at Messiah College, his employer.  Louisville Ladder manufactured the ladder.  
Messiah College purchased the ladder from W.W. Grainger, Inc. (collectively, with 
Louisville Ladder, “Appellees”).  Asserting diversity jurisdiction, Jackson filed a 
products-liability action in federal court against Appellees.  Jackson’s Amended 
Complaint alleged two causes of action under Pennsylvania law: negligence against 
Louisville Ladder and strict liability against both companies.  A primary contention 
between the parties as the case proceeded was whether the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which provides for liability regardless of fault, or the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 
which includes a risk-utility analysis, applied to the strict-liability claims.  Although the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, the District Court determined 
that, pursuant to our precedent, it would “apply … the Restatement (Third) of Torts to 
Plaintiff’s strict liability claims.”  (App. at 11.)     
Before trial, Appellees filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of other step-
ladder accidents because Jackson “ha[d] not established that any of those incidents or 
injuries were substantially similar” to his.  (App. at 18.)   The District Court granted the 
motion.  Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Appellees.  Jackson filed 
a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the 
District Court denied. Jackson timely appealed that order.   
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II. Discussion
1
 
 Jackson raises two issues on appeal.  First, he argues that the District Court erred 
in adopting the Restatement (Third) over the Restatement (Second) as applied to strict 
liability.  Second, he contends that the Court committed error by granting Appellees’ 
motion in limine precluding evidence of other accidents and injuries involving ladders 
because those accidents were substantially similar to the one he suffered.  Alternatively, 
he argues that those past accidents, aggregated in the form of statistical and 
“epidemiological studies,” are not subject to the “substantially similar” requirement.  
(Appellant’s Br. at 12.)  None of his arguments are persuasive.  
Regarding which Restatement applies to strict liability, it is unclear exactly how 
Jackson thinks that issue should affect the instant appeal; he argues that “[t]his case will 
be controlled by the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court’s [d]ecision in Tincher v. Omega 
Flex, Inc.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 7.)  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has granted a 
Petition for Allowance of Appeal in Tincher to decide the following issue:  “Whether this 
Court should replace the strict liability analysis of Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement with the analysis of the Third Restatement.”  64 A.3d 626, 626 (Pa. 2013) 
                                              
 
1
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review whether a district court’s denial of 
a motion for new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitutes 
an abuse of discretion.  Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 1289 (3d Cir. 1993).  “Our 
degree of scrutiny, however, differs depending on the [proposed] reasons for granting the 
new trial.”  Id.  As to a decision based “purely on a question of law … we exercise 
plenary review.  Conversely, the district court’s latitude on a new trial motion is broad 
[regarding] a ruling on a matter that initially rested within the discretion of the court, e.g. 
evidentiary rulings … .”  Id. at 1289-90 (citations omitted). 
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(per curiam).  That Court has also directed the parties in that case “to brief the question of 
whether, if the Court were to adopt the Third Restatement, that holding should be applied 
prospectively or retroactively.”  Id. at 626-27.  Jackson does not ask us to stay his appeal 
pending Tincher’s resolution; instead, he only seems to hope that Tincher comes out in 
his favor prior to the case’s disposition.   
In any event, we are bound, as the District Court was, by our previous 
determination in Berrier v. Simplicity Manufacturing, Inc., 563 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2009), 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  See 
id. at 40 (“We predict that if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were confronted with [a 
strict-liability] issue, it would adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts … .”).  That 
decision applies in this diversity action.  “In the absence of a controlling decision by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, a federal court applying that state’s substantive law must 
predict how Pennsylvania’s highest court would decide this case.”  Berrier, 563 F.3d at 
45-46.  Jackson does not dispute that the District Court properly concluded that Berrier 
controls.  Accordingly, his argument fails.    
Regarding Jackson’s evidence-related claims, they are foreclosed by our decision 
in Barker v. Deere & Co., 60 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1995), as the District Court correctly 
concluded.  Barker established that, in products-liability cases, evidence of prior 
accidents is not relevant, and is therefore inadmissible, unless the accidents occurred 
under “substantially similar” circumstances.  Id. at 162.  In Barker, we noted that the 
“foundational requirement of establishing substantial similarity is especially important in 
cases where the evidence is proffered to show the existence of a design defect.”  Id.  In 
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other words, evidence of other accidents is not relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence unless those accidents are shown to be substantially similar to the one 
at issue.  Id. at 162-63.  Jackson did not introduce evidence that the additional accidents 
occurred on the same ladder model as his or under similar circumstances.  In fact, his 
experts testified that the articles they relied on referred to all types of ladders.  Thus, the 
District Court did not err in precluding that evidence. 
Jackson also argues that the evidence of other accidents is actually 
“epidemiological” data and that the requirement for substantial similarity is “not 
applicable to epidemiological evidence.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  That argument is 
without merit.  Like the District Court, we are “not persuaded … that evidence of ladder 
accidents is epidemiological in nature.”  (App. at 8.)  This case does not relate to 
epidemiology, i.e., the study of the incidence of disease in large populations, and the 
supporting cases cited by Jackson, dealing with epidemiological studies, are simply 
inapplicable.
2
  
                                              
2
 Alternatively, Jackson argues that the Restatement (Third) of Torts changes the 
other-evidence standard because it introduced a risk-utility balancing into strict products 
liability.  This argument confuses a substantive standard with the admissibility standard 
set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Our holding in Barker, relating to the 
admissibility of evidence under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is not 
affected by a change in substantive products-liability law. 
Jackson also sets forth additional arguments straining to justify his position that 
the District Court should have admitted the data regarding past ladder accidents.  Those 
arguments are without merit and warrant no further discussion.  As set forth above, the 
District Court’s evidentiary determination under Rule 401 was proper.   
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III. Conclusion 
 We will accordingly affirm the District Court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for a 
new trial. 
